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ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
Protective order may not set aside sheriff's sale after deed is
delivered
In order to ensure the fair and equitable enforcement of money
judgments under Article 52 of the CPLR,'52 section 5240 empowers
a codrt to alter the nature and extent of any enforcement .device
employed. 53 Although CPLR 5240 may be invoked prior to comple-
tion154 of a sheriff's sale of real property,'55 it has remained unclear
whether this remedial power may be exercised after the property is
,52 E.g., CPLR 5222 (1978) (restraining notice); id. 5225 (order to deliver property); id.
5226 (installment payment order); id. 5227 (payment of debt owed to judgment debtor); id.
5231 (income execution); id. 5232-5233 (sale of personal property); id. 5235-5236 (sale of real
property). Article 52 of the CPLR is an exhaustive revision of Article 45 of the former Civil
Practice Act. CPA art. 52 (repealed by ch. 308, § 101 [1962] N.Y. Laws 1299). The revision
was required to eliminate the abuse of enforcement procedures by debtors and creditors
which resulted from the CPA's "illogical distinctions,, inconsistencies and pitfalls." Tnm
REP. 233-44. See generally Donohue, Enforcement of Judgments Other Than by Execution
Under the CPLR, 9 N.Y.L.F. 300, 300-04 (1963). The legislature, in effecting the revision,
segregated provisions concerning the enforcement of money judgments from enforcement
procedures for most other types of judgments. See SIEGEL § 476, at 637.
153 CPLR 5240 (1978), in pertinent part, provides:
The court may at any time, on its own initiatve or the motion of any'inter-
ested person, and upon such notice as it may equire, make an order denying,
limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforce-
ment procedure ....
Believing that protection from enforcement abuse would be obtained more effectively by one
central provision, the framers of article 52 consolidated scattered regulatory sections of the
CPA into CPLR 5240. See THMD REP. 314. The court's powers under CPLR 5240 are stated
broadly to ensure their applicability to all article 52 procedures. See Gorea v. Pinsky, 50
App. Div. 2d 713, 714, 374 N.Y.S.2d 879, 881 (4th Dep't 1975); CPLR 5246, commentary at
451-52 (1978); 6 WK&M 5240.01. An order under CPLR 5240 may be issued by the court
sua sponte or upon the motion of an interested party. SIEGEL § 522, at 713.
,51 E.g., Hammond v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 546, 336
N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (husband's creditors restrained from executing
on his interest in tenancy by the entirety), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 580, 603 (1973); Holmes v. W.T. Grant, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 486, 336 N.Y.S.2d 601
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (execution sale postponed in lieu of $20 monthly payments);
Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1971) (impending sheriff's sale cancelled and creditor ordered to collect through al-
ternate means), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 355, 378 (1971).
"I CPLR 5236, which provides for the execution sale of real property, requires public
advertisement and notice to the debtor and to all creditors having a lien in the property.
CPLR 5236(c) (1978). Subject to postponement, it sets a sale date between the 8th and 9th
weeks following notice. CPLR 5236(a) (1978). Unlike the former CPA, there is no require-
ment that the judgment creditor exhaust the personal assets of the debtor before resorting to
execution and sale of his residence. See CPA § 643. The authors of article 52 felt this prereq-
uisite placed an "unwarranted burden on judgment creditors and [showed a] tenderness for
the judgment debtor." THIRD REP. 242; see 6 WK&M 5230.10.
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sold.15 In Guardian Loan Co. v. Early,157 the Court of Appeals re-
cently held that, although some circumstances may warrant equi-
table relief, the protective power of CPLR 5240 is unavailable once
a sheriff's sale of real property is executed in conformity with stat-
ute and a deed is delivered to a bona fide purchaser. "'
In Guardian Loan, the plaintiff levied a judgment of approxi-
mately $1,200 on the defendants' residence.'59 Following proper ad-
vertisement and notice to the defendants, 10 the sheriff sold the
property to a stranger to the original action for approximately
$3,000, an amount far less than the debtors' equity in the prop-
erty. ' The proceeds of the sale were then applied to satisfy the
"I Compare Murphy v. Grid Realty Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 1071, 1073, 343 N.Y.S.2d 670,
671-72 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973) and In re Bacher, 82 Misc. 2d 107, 109, 368
N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (CPLR 5240 unavailable after judicial sale
of real property completed) with Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 755 Misc. 2d 32, 39, 346
N.Y.S.2d 925, 932 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973) (CPLR 5240 and the court's power of
equity invoked after judicial sale).
Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, a judgment debtor had the right to redeem his
property within 1 year following its sale by the sheriff. CPA § 724-727; see THaw REp. 302-
03. With the enactment of the CPLR, the right of redemption after sale was abolished in the
hope of bringing higher prices at sheriffs' sales by freeing purchasers from the possibility of
losing their purchased property. See generally CPLR 5236, commentary at 430-31 (1978).
The 8 week period between notice of sale and the actual sale, see note 155 supra, was in-
tended to overcome the anticipated objections to the abolition of redemption by allowing the
debtor a redemption period before the sale. Siegel, The Sale of Real Property Pursuant to an
Execution Under the CPLR, TENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 120, 122-23 (1965). The
aim of the abolition of redemption-obtaining higher prices-has not been effectively at-
tained. See, e.g., Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d at 517, 392 N.E.2d at 42, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 58 (equity of $39,000 lost to $3,020 bid); Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 755 Misc.
2d 32, 36, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925, 929 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973) ($26,000 equity sold for
$500); Community Capital Corp. v. Lee, 58 Misc. 2d 34, 35, 294 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1968) ($18,000 equity sold for $197). See generally 6 WK&M 5236.20; Com-
ment, Enforcement of Money Judgments Against Real Property in New York, 1 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 214 (1973).
It should be noted that the abolition of redemption rights in execution sales of real
property has not been extended to mortgaged property unless the possessors of interest in
such property are made parties to the foreclosure action. See Quaremba v. Nassau Suffolk
Lumber & Supply Corp., 21 Misc. 2d 645, 189 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1959).
' 47 N.Y.2d 515, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1979), rev'g 64 App. Div. 2d 689,
407 N.Y.S.2d 571 (2d Dep't 1978).
' 47 N.Y.2d at 522, 392 N.E.2d at 1244, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
' ' Id. at 517, 392 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
' Id.; see note 155 supra.
' 47 N.Y.2d at 517-18, 392 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58. The judgment debt-
ors' residence had a fair market value of $48,000 but was subject to a mortgage of $9,000 and
unsatisfied liens amounting to approximately $11,000. Id. This reduced its net value to ap-
proximately $28,000. The property was sold at execution for $3,020. Id. As the Court noted,
execution sales of a judgment debtors' home usually result in a purchase price far below the
fair market value of the residence. Id.; see, e.g., Levine v. Berlin, 46 App. Div. 2d 902, 903,
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judgment creditors and the property was deeded to the third-party
purchaser.16 The debtors subsequently moved to vacate the sale
and void the deed, buttressing their claim for relief on circum-
stances which prevented them from paying the judgment." 3 The
Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the motion and a divided
Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed on the ground
that the inadequate purchase price, coupled with the debtors' good
faith efforts to pay the judgment, supported the lower court's ap-
plication of CPLR 5240.164
In an opinion written by Chief Judge Cooke, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed," 5 observing that notwithstanding their good faith
efforts, the debtors, even on the day of the sale, lacked the funds to
satisfy the judgment."16 Acknowledging that courts are given
"broad discretionary powers" to regulate the enforcement of money
judgments under CPLR 5240, Chief Judge Cooke reasoned that
since the section "relates to the use of an enforcement device," it is
inapplicable where enforcement is complete. 16 7 Permitting a lawful
362 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189 (2d Dep't 1974); Concord Landscapers, Inc. v. Pincus, 41 App. Div. 2d
759, 760, 341 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (2d Dep't 1973); In re Bachner, 82 Misc. 2d 107, 108, 368
N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975); Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc. 2d
32, 33, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973). Such sales often inflict
extreme hardship upon the judgment debtor. See Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec. Corp., 73
Misc. 2d 363, 364-65, 341 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534-35 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973); Hammond
v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc., 71 Misc.2d 546, 546-47, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494-95
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. l~v.
580, 603 (1973); Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791, 792-93, 322 N.Y.S.2d
200, 202 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 355, 378 (1971).
162 47 N.Y.2d at 517, 392 N.E.2d at 1241, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
"1 Id. at 517-18, 392 N.E.2d at 1242, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58. The debtors claimed that on
the day of the sale a flat tire on their car prevented them from getting to the sale with $1,100
in cash to satisfy most of the debt. Id.
"1 64 App. Div. 2d 689, 407 N.Y.S.2d 571 (2d Dep't 1978), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 392
N.E.2d 1240, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1979). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Gulotta argued that
the interest of the innocent purchaser at a valid judicial sale must be paramount to that of
the judgment debtor in order to preserve the stability of titles. 64 App. Div. 2d at 689-90, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 572.
'- 47 N.Y.2d at 518, 392 N.E.2d at 1242, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58. All the judges concurred
except Judge Fuchsberg, who took no part in the decision.
16 Id. at 521, 392 N.E.2d at 1244, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
6 Id. at 519-20, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59. The Court observed that its
ruling did not leave the judgment debtor completely remediless since CPLR 2003 permits a
court to set aside a defective sale within 1 year after the sale for a failure to comply with the
CPLR as to the notice, time, or manner of such sale, "if a substantial right of a party was
prejudiced by the defect." CPLR 2003 (1978). 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 60; accord, Levine v. Berlin, 46 App. Div. 2d 902, 903, 362 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189
(2d Dep't 1974); see Criterion Capital Corp. v. Valven Holding Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 878,
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sale to be set aside after title has been transferred to a purchaser,
according to the Court, would discourage third parties from partici-
pating at judicial sales, since title may be invalidated at any later
time.16 Moreover, the Court determined that a different holding
would constitute a judicial restoration of the equity of redemption,
a remedy abolished by the Legislature when enacting the CPLR.19
Nevertheless, it was found that fraud, mistake, or overreaching
would justify the invocation of a court's traditional equity powers,
even after a sale."' As in Guardian Loan, however, the Court found
that a sale may not be vacated merely because the purchase price
was inadequate.'
Grounded in a concern for preserving the viability of judicial
sales and protecting the rights of bona fide purchasers, the Guard-
ian Loan holding appears to be in accord with prior decisions deny-
ing relief under CPLR 5240 where the debtor merely has com-
plained of an inadequate purchase price.' In addition to effecting
878, 259 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947 (2d Dep't 1965) (failure to post notice will not invoke CPLR 2003
if party not prejudiced). See also Gegerson v. Northern Operating Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d
837, 838, 342 N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (2d Dep't 1973); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. McKee, 61
Misc. 2d 693, 696, 305 N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
"' 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
,e' Id. at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60; see note 156 supra.
,7 Id. at 520-21, 392 N.E.2d at 1243-44, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 60. Chief Judge Cooke acknowl-
edged that the Court possesses "equitable power over a sale made pursuant to its judgment
or decree to ensure that it is not made the instrument of injustice." Id. The Chief Judge
continued that "[w]here the judgment debtor can show not merely disparity in price, but in
addition one of the categories integral to the invocation of equity, such as fraud, mistake or
exploitive overreaching, a court of equity may grant relief." Id. at 521, 392 N.E.2d at 1244,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 60; accord, Murphy v. Grid Realty Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 1071, 1072, 343
N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973); Dime Say. Bank v. Thomas, 24 Misc. 2d
850, 851-52, 209 N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960). But see Holness v.
McGillian, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1969, at 19, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County) (despite ab-
sence of fraud court may use equity powers to set aside sale which produced very low
purchase price).
1 47 N.Y.2d at 521-22, 392 N.E.2d at 1244, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61. The Court suggested
that anticipation of an inadequate price should have prompted resort to CPLR 5240 by the
debtors between delivery of the execution to the sheriff and the sale of the property. 47 N.Y.
2d at 522, 392 N.E.2d at 1244, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
",2 See In re Bachner, 82 Misc. 2d 107, 368 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1975); Murphy v. Grid Realty Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 1071, 343 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1973). The Court's holding is consistent with past treatment of inadequate prices at
other types of judicial sales, such as the sale of a debtor's residence resulting from a judicial
order at a foreclosure or bankruptcy proceeding. In Hammerman v. Ferguson, 50 App. Div.
2d 853, 376 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d Dep't 1975), for example, the court reversed the set-aside sher-
iff's sale, stating that "mere inadequacy of price, without allegations of other mitigating
circumstances, will not sustain a motion to set aside a foreclosure sale." Id. at 854, 376
N.Y.S.2d at 608 (citations omitted); see Mauer v. Butler, 55 App. Div. 2d 784, 784, 389
N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (3d Dep't 1976). But cf. Central Trust Co. v. Alcon Developers, Inc., 93
19801
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the legislative abolition of the right of redemption, 3 the Court's
holding supports the continued use of execution sales as an effec-
tive enforcement device."' Having focused on the unavailability of
the section once the rights of innocent third parties are impli-
cated,175 however, the Court's decision should not preclude equita-
ble relief after delivery of the deed to a purchaser who is not a
stranger to the underlying judgment. If the purchaser is connected
to the judgment creditor, and the purchase price of real or personal
property is inadequate, it would appear that a court could invoke
its equitable powers to set aside the sale. 7 1
Although Guardian Loan clearly indicated that the use of
CPLR 5240 is impermissible once an enforcement device is com-
plete, 7 7 the Court encouraged the use of CPLR 5240 by the debtor
to suggest alternatives to, or modifications of, the proposed sher-
Misc. 2d 686, 687-88, 403 N.Y.S.2d 396, 396-97 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1978) (price of $1
received on property to satisfy $1,894,109 judgment so "grossly inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the Court"). See also State Realty & Mortgage Co. v. Villaume, 121 App. Div.
793, 795, 106 N.Y.S. 698, 699 (1st Dep't 1907); Housman v. Wright, 50 App. Div. 606, 608-09,
64 N.Y.S. 71, 72-73 (2d Dep't 1900).
173 See note 156 supra.
17, As Chief Judge Cooke noted, allowing the debtor's motion "would discourage partici-
pation by third parties at judicial sales, for the title acquired at the sale would never be free
from the spectre of judicial invalidation." 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 59; accord, Murphy v. Grid Realty Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 1071, 1073, 343 N.Y.S.2d
670, 671-72 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973); cf. Housman v. Wright, 50 App. Div. 606, 609,
64 N.Y.S. 71, 73 (2d Dep't 1900) (court must ensure confidence of purchasers at judicial
sale).
175 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
"7I Although the Guardian Loan decision seems to suggest that CPLR 5240 may be
available to void a completed sale where the purchaser is the judgment creditor, it is sub-
mitted that the clear language of CPLR 5240, which allows its invocation only during the use
of an enforcement device, bars such a result. The section draws no distinction between a
third-party purchaser and a creditor-purchaser. Nevertheless, an inadequate purchase price,
if paid by the purchaser-creditor, should be sufficient ground for a court to grant equitable
relief. The use of equity in this situation would be consistent with the Guardian Loan
Court's repeated intimations that a different result would have obtained if the purchaser was
not "bona fide." Moreover, it would not conflict with the Court's statement that equitable
relief is available when there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or overreaching.
By not distinguishing between a third-party purchaser and a creditor-purchaser, Guard-
ian Loan impliedly rejected the use of CPLR 5240 in Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc. 2d
32, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), where the court analogized the
position of the judgment creditor-purchaser to that of a mortgagee in a foreclosure sale and
used both its equitable powers and CPLR 5240 to invoke the foreclosure procedure of credit-
ing the judgment with the market value of the purchased property. Id. at 36, 346 N.Y.S.2d
at 929; see RPAPL § 1371(2) (1979). It is suggested that if the facts in Wandschneider were
before the Court of Appeals today, the use of equity, but not CPLR 5240, would be consis-
tent with the Guardian Loan decision.
17 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
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iff's sale.7 ' In illustrating and emphasizing the availability of
CPLR 5240 before the sale, the Court approvingly cited lower court
orders that directed creditors to satisfy judgments by "less intru-
sive means" than the sale of residences'7 and that varied the terms
of sales of real property to improve the chances of obtaining repre-
sentative prices.' 0 It appears, therefore, that the CPLR 5240 reme-
dies available during an enforcement proceeding are limited, in
large measure, only by the imagination and inventiveness of the
debtor's attorney and the court."8 ' It is hoped that the courts will
continue to implement CPLR 5240 where appropriate to protect
debtors from the harsh consequences often associated with the en-
forcement of money judgments.
Robert W. Corcoran, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL 470.05: Defendant's failure to assert double jeopardy defense
at trial held no bar to review on appeal
In a criminal proceeding, the Court of Appeals generally may
'7' Id. at 519, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59. Unfortunately, as noted by vari-
ous courts, the typical judgment debtor is unaccustomed to the legal intricacies of enforce-
ment procedures and often does not resort to an attorney until the sale is completed. Con-
cord Landscapers, Inc. v. Pincus, 41 App. Div. 2d 759, 760, 341 N.Y.S.2d 538, 541 (2d Dep't
1973). As one court characterized it, a debtor is "beset by apathy, indifference and fear until
confronted with the unyielding legality of the sale of his personal residence." Lee v. Commu-
nity Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1971).
' ' 47 N.Y.2d at 519, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
"' Id. CPLR 5240 is designed to protect "any person, whether or not a party, who is in
danger of suffering pecuniary loss or of being subjected to harassment through use of an
enforcement procedure." 6 WK&M T 5240.02. CPLR 5240 has been invoked to protect
against various abuses accompanying the sale, or threatened sale, of a judgment debtor's
property. See, e.g., Abby Financial Corp. v. Angelis, 45 App. Div. 2d 968, 359 N.Y.S.2d 585
(2d Dep't 1974) (sale of guarantor's home vacated due to false statements in the execution);
Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec. Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 363, 341 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1973) (sale of husband's interest in tenancy by the entirety postponed); Hammond
v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 546, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972) (creditor ordered to wait until husband's interest in tenancy by entirety de-
stroyed by death, divorce, or sale of house); Holmes v. W. T. Grant, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 486,
336 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (creditor ordered to accept $20 per week in
lieu of execution upon welfare recipient's home); Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp. 66
Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971) (interest of children para-
mount to that of creditor), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. R.v. 355, 378
(1971).
" See note 180 supra. See also CPLR 5228, commentary at 09-10 (appoint receiver for
private sale); CPLR 5236, commentary at 425 (motion for extension of time to pay).
